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Abstract: This paper seeks to examine the significance of Derrida’s work for an
understanding of the basic tenets of phenomenology. Specifically, via an analysis of his
understanding of the subject’s relation to the future, we will see that Derrida enhances the
phenomenological understanding of temporality and intentionality, thereby moving the
project of phenomenology forward in a unique way. This, in turn, suggests that future
phenomenological research will have to account for an essential (rather than merely a
secondary) role for both linguistic mediation and cultural and political factors within the
phenomenological subject itself.
Derrida and the Future(s) of Phenomenology

The relationship between Derrida and phenomenology seems to have reached a
stalemate. On the one hand, Derrida’s contribution to phenomenology is generally
restricted to questions of historical influence and reception. On the other hand, many
Husserlian scholars have troubles with—or flat out reject—Derrida’s reading of Husserl
as misguided, confused, or both. Reading Derrida’s contribution to phenomenology
solely through his reading of Husserl, then, enables us to broach the question of
phenomenology from within Derrida’s work, but its limited scope enables more
phenomenologically-minded scholars to ignore Derrida as a significant contributor.
Hence, the stalemate: either Derrida is an important interpreter of Husserl, or he is not;
this—and this alone—will decide Derrida’s relationship to phenomenology.
In this paper, I would like to push beyond this stalemate to study what Derrida’s
importance to the central issues of phenomenology itself. To do so, it will, of course, be
necessary to examine the function that Husserl plays in Derrida’s thought, but this
function can only be properly understood in relationship to a third term: Levinas. In the
context of this (un)holy triumvirate, we can learn three points that get at the heart of
phenomenology itself: first, the fundamental necessity of futurity, not just to
phenomenological temporality, but to the phenomenological method itself; second, a
clarification of the concept of intentionality in a distinctly phenomenological register; and
finally, a renewed vision of the central problems of phenomenology in terms of the scope
and application of the phenomenological method. At stake in this discussion of Derrida,
we will see, is the future of phenomenological research itself.
In order to fully understand Derrida’s contributions to the future of
phenomenology, we must first look at his contributions to understanding the future within
phenomenology. To begin, then, we must highlight the centrality of futurity to two
distinct accounts of phenomenology and phenomenological intentionality: first, the
Husserlian account of subjective constitution within horizons; and second, the Levinasian
account of the reversal of that sense of constitution in the relation to alterity (Section I).
Then, we will be in position to understand Derrida’s thought—from the early work on
differance through the later work on justice and the messianic—in the context of these
competing visions of phenomenology, as offering a phenomenology that holds in tension
these two competing vision (Section II). From this, we will elaborate the resulting theory
of intentionality that Derrida can be understood to offer (Section III), before moving on to
discuss the implications of this theory for the future of phenomenological research

(Section IV).
I. Futurity and Phenomenology: Two Accounts
Before we can elaborate the contributions of Derrida to phenomenology, we must
first explore the phenomenological context in which Derrida thought himself to be
operating. This context fluctuates between two main poles: the notion of subjective
constitution, on one hand, and that of openness to alterity, on the other. Let us look at the
figures emblematic of each those two poles: Husserl and Levinas, respectively.
A. Husserl: Futurity and Subjective Constitution
Husserlian phenomenology shows a strong bias toward subjective constitution.
His analyses focus, not only on how the subject is able to constitute a world, but also on
how the subject is able to constitute its own subjective lived experiences.1 Hence,
Husserl divides subjective constitution into three main levels: first, that of the
constitution of its own stream of experiences via the constitution of internal time; second,
the passive or non-egoic constitution of the world; and third, the egoically-directed acts
of consciousness within the world.2
At each of these levels, we see an essential role played by the future, suggesting
that a distinctly futural temporality is essential to phenomenology. At the level of internal
time-consciousness, the Bernau Manuscripts make clear that protention is a key concept
in Husserl’s accounts of absolute consciousness and of intentionality. Because of the
distinction in modes of bringing to intuition (that is between clarifying and confirming
modes)3 that protention alone provides, consciousness is able to confirm the present
object as the fulfillment of the previously expected object,4 and therefore provide the
fulfillment necessary for absolute consciousness.5
Protention is also essential to intentionality. Protention, as “an intention ‘directed’
at what comes later,”6 differs most notably from retention because only protention has
the “striving” character of directedness7 that comprises “the fundamental character of
[intentionality] in its most original essential composition.”8
Futurity, then, is essential to the functioning of the phenomenological subject on
the most basic level of its own self-constitution. It also marks the level of the subject’s
passive constitution of the world: it is only because our previous experiences are retained
in a horizon “of actual and possible expectations”9 that we are able to expect the nonpresent sides of a particular given object (for example, the back of a chair), and therefore
apperceive what is in front of me as the object that it is (for example, a chair). Later,
however, Husserl will want to separate the acts of egoic consciousness into those marked
by absence and those that remain fully present (in enjoyment), and to tie futurity, via
anticipation, solely to the former.10 This raises the question of how futurity could fail to
apply to some egoically-directed acts, when it is necessary to the more basic levels of
constitution that precede them. It is especially problematic when the non-anticipatory acts
of enjoyment are supposed to occur in the interior mental life of the subject, yet it is
precisely the subjectivity of the subject that must be constituted—and with an essential
role played by futurity in that constitution—if Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is
to move past Kant.11

Husserl says that the forms of subjectivity are “only conceivable in genesis,”12
and that this notion of genesis is what distinguishes his work from that of Kant (Hua XI,
126). This problematic notion of genesis in phenomenology provides the starting point
for Derrida’s own philosophy, but before we move directly to that, let us finish examining
the phenomenological context of Derrida’s work by elaborating the “other” side of
Husserl, which he introduced but did not, perhaps, sufficiently develop. To do this, we
must turn to the figure who did more than any other in phenomenology to develop this
other side of Husserl: Emmanuel Levinas.
B. The ‘Other’ Husserl, an Other Futurity: Levinas and Alterity
Where Husserlian intentionality is premised on the directedness of subjective acts
from the subject to the world, Levinas reverses this move in his characterization of his
own work on intentionality as a reversal of sense-bestowal [Sinngegebung].13 However,
for Levinas this is not a move away from Husserl, but rather a reinvigoration of the
“forgotten horizons” of Husserl’s thought,14 horizons which constituted Husserl’s most
innovative breakthrough. Levinas understands intentionality as “essentially the act of
bestowing a sense (the Sinngebung).”15 However, Levinas notes, following Husserl,16
that this sense-bestowal moves in both directions: intentionality is not merely the act of
the subject’s bestowing meaning on the world, but is rather the act of the subject’s being
in relation with the concrete.17
This act of the subject’s being in relation to something absolutely distinct from
itself is characterized by Levinas as futurity.18 Whereas for Husserl futurity was about
subjective constitution within horizons (of retention and expectation), for Levinas futurity
is about the subject’s being-constituted by that which lies outside itself, and therefore
comes to the subject in the mode of surprise (TO, 79). This reaches its zenith in Levinas’
understanding of the subject as hostage of, or substituted for, the Other, who calls, solicits
or constitutes the subject in the mode of responsibility. Otherwise than Being is Levinas’
landmark attempt to explain this idea, and it claims to “remain faithful to intentional
analysis” (OB, 183). It can be faithful to intentionality, however, only by reconceiving
intentionality as a sense-bestowal that is “essentially respectful of the Other” (RR, 121).
For Levinas, this respect can be maintained only be acknowledging the one thing that he
believes intentionality makes apparent, more than anything else—that the subject is not
(only) constituting, but is primarily constituted.
Against the self-enclosed nature of subjective constitution, Levinas raises the
specter of an “eschatological” (cf. TI, 22-26) understanding of the subject as being
always oriented toward—and constituted by—what lies outside itself. But this is not our
first invocation of eschatology in this paper. Remember that our Husserlian analysis of
anticipation already introduced a certain eschatological character into the heart of
experience, characterizing (almost all) subjective experience as already occurring in the
present, but promising yet more fulfillment in the future. At stake here is the relationship
between the phenomenological subject and that which is foreign to the subject; the
relation, in other words, that Husserl meant to describe by the phrase intentionality.
II. Derrida’s Phenomenology of Tension
Two distinct accounts of intentionality can be deduced from the accounts of the
relation to the future discussed so far: on the one hand, past experiences become the

horizons by which we constitute the present according to expectations of the future; on
the other, we have a present that makes sense only because the future has reached back
and offered itself to us partially, in the mode of a trace19 or promise.20 These correspond
to an intentionality that seeks to move from the subject to the world (a broadly Kantian or
idealist understanding of intentionality) and an intentionality that seeks to move from the
world to the subject (a naively realist and perhaps even reductively materialist
understanding of intentionality). Neither of these accounts of intentionality is sufficiently
phenomenological.
Husserl believed his phenomenology to be unique in that it alone dealt with the
constitution of the stream of subjective experience (contra the a priori subjectivity of
Kantian idealism and the lack of significance of subjectivity in materialism). Husserl
attempts to explain this constitution via the notion of subjective genesis,21 while
Levinas’ sought the genesis of the phenomenological subject outside that subject. Both of
these attempts, Derrida claims, fail to pay sufficient attention to the two-fold movement
of intentionality necessitated by phenomenological genesis, and hence neither is
phenomenological enough to adequately distinguish phenomenology from other
philosophical disciplines.
A. The Necessity of Genetic Phenomenology
This issue of genesis is the starting point of Derrida’s philosophy. Genesis is both
central to phenomenology and yet constitutes a problem for it because genesis contains
an apparent contradiction within its very nature: on the one hand, the notion of genesis
requires a context that is “its own,”22 thus echoing the Husserlian notion of constitution
with the horizons of the subject; on the other hand, the genesis can occur only in a
context that “goes beyond” the subject and “envelops it from all sides,”23 thereby
echoing the Levinasian notion of the constitution of the subject by an Other who
transcends that subject absolutely.24
The significance of the future within the competing accounts of Levinas and
Husserl is not accidental, but is necessary, Derrida claims, if phenomenology “wishes to
respect the temporality of the originary lived experience,”25 in which “it is always
through an ‘anticipation’ which is at least formal, that any signification, founded on an a
priori synthesis, appears, and appears to itself originarily.”26 This is to say that the
phenomenological principle of principles27 is premised on the self-givenness
[Selbstgegebenheit] of lived experience, and, since this lived experience gives itself in
and as time, phenomenology must account for the temporalization of lived experience by
matching that temporalization with an analogous temporalization in (phenomenological)
analysis. This temporal analysis, as we will see, is genesis, and therefore every truly
phenomenological analysis must be genetic phenomenological analysis.
B. Transcendental Genesis
While Husserl clearly recognized the need for genetic analysis,28 his genetic
accounts are insufficient because they fail to fully challenge the appeal to universal
essences. Even in his latest works, where his analyses appear to take on their most
genetic character, Husserl continues to maintain a rigorous distinction between
transcendental constitution and empirical existence,29 and decides stridently for the
former. In doing so, he confines himself to a static search for that which is already

constituted, instead of that which is constituting. As with any static account, this method
necessarily privileges one of the two poles of the constituting relation at the expense of
the other: by focusing on the constituting power of the subject, Husserl runs the risk of
psychologism, in its transcendental (Kant) rather than its mundane (Mill, Sigwart)
variation.30
Such a move is not sufficiently phenomenological, Derrida argues, because it
misses “the origin and becoming of logic” in genesis.31 But as long as the sharp
distinction is maintained between transcendental constitution and empirical existence, the
significance of genesis for phenomenology can never be appreciated. That this genesis
cannot be purely empirical is obvious, given Husserl’s adamant rejection of mundane
psychologism in volume I of Logical Investigations. But the possibility of
“transcendental” genesis—that is, the attempt to account for the fact that sense and
meaning are essentially becoming, as the subject is simultaneously constituted and
constituting itself and the world—is problematized by its own genetic sense: as an
essential becoming, “transcendental” genesis must not take place within the realm of
what is already constituted (if it is to be originary and transcendental), and hence cannot
appeal to universal essences or constituted subjects. For this reason, a transcendental
sense of genesis must not reduce historical and factual existence to some universalized
essence, which would be “no more than a concept in disguise” (PG, xxxviii). Indeed,
transcendental genesis “must not be the object of a reduction,” for if it is to be an
originary becoming, “what subject will absolute meaning appear for? How can absolute
and monadic transcendental subjectivity be at the same time a becoming that is
constituting itself?” (PG, xxxix). Derrida’s answers by suggesting that, rather than being
reduced or being revealed by the reduction, transcendental genesis makes possible the
reduction itself (Ibid.). In order to accurately account for transcendental genesis, then,
empirical and factual existence cannot be reduced. Yet, simultaneously (and this is the
paradox, the problem, the seemingly contradictory double-necessity) they must be
reduced, for it is only after the reduction that something can be rigorously and properly
transcendental, that is to say, phenomenological.32
This problem, then, establishes a fundamental “dialectic” at the heart of
phenomenology, a dialectic that is ontological in nature.33 “This ontology,” Derrida
claims, “will show, by deepening the phenomenology of temporality, that at the level of
the originary temporal existence, fact and essence, the empirical and the transcendental,
are inseparable and dialectically of a piece.”34 Because, in Husserl’s analysis of time,
“every constituting moment … brings with it a constituted moment in the intimacy of its
foundation,”35 the very absolute of time-constituting consciousness is itself always
already composed of constituted moments. “This essential intrusion of constituted time
into constituting time does not allow us to make the distinction rigorously between” pure,
transcendental constitution and the facticity of existence,36 and so Derrida calls for a
fundamental reorientation of phenomenology that would “put us in contact with the
existent as such.”37 The “originarily synthetic identification of consciousness and time”
prevalent in phenomenology “is equivalent to confusing the pure subject with an
originarily historical existence that is … the very ‘existence’ of the subject. This
existence, as originarily temporal and finite, is ‘in the world.’”38
Hence the problem of genesis, the problem of identifying the relationship between
constituting and constituted, the problem of the passage between “primitive existence”

and “originary sense,”39 arises precisely because of Husserl’s temporal analyses. It is the
purpose of genetic phenomenology to speak to this problem, to “retrace the absolute
itinerary that leads from prepredicative evidence to predicative evidence” (PG 106;
translation modified40), to explain, in other words, the passage from primitive existence
to sense. We can now understand the claim already cited that a “phenomenological
philosophy must be genetic if it wishes to respect the temporality of the originary lived
experience.”41
C. Phenomenological Genesis
Derrida attempts to provide such a genetic phenomenology, or at least a
phenomenological account of genesis. This account grows out of the analysis of the
originary “dialectic” at the heart of phenomenology. To understand the importance of
phenomenology to Derrida’s work—and vice versa—we must first understand the central
importance that this “dialectic” has in Derrida’s philosophy. While this may seem
surprising, given the fact that this word seems to drop out of Derrida’s work already by
the early 60s, we will see that, as Derrida continues to explore the idea expressed by this
term, he is forced to change how he talks about it, ultimately tying such key
deconstructive themes as differance and the messianic inexorably to the originary
dialectic that characterizes phenomenology.
i. From Dialectic to difference
In his preface to the 1990 edition of The Problem of Genesis, an older (and
perhaps wiser and more cautious) Derrida explains that the “law of differential
contamination” which “imposes its logic from one end of [The Problem of Genesis] to the
other” received, in 1953/53 a “philosophical name that I have had to give up: dialectic, an
‘originary dialectic.’”42 This dialectic is a kind of “hyperdialecticism,” a going beyond
dialectic “in the course of a very respectful critique,”43 and it will never cease to function
in Derrida’s work.
The word dialectic, however, does cease to function as a positive aspect of
Derrida’s work, by 1967. Already in the preface to the 1953/54 version of The Problem of
Genesis, Derrida speaks of “unperceived entailment or of dissimulated contamination.”44
This theme of contamination emerges more forcefully into Derrida’s lexicon once the
word dialectic ceases to play a significant role. Indeed, Derrida himself says that “the
very word ‘contamination’ has not stopped imposing itself on me from thence [that is,
1953/54] forward” (PG, xv), as it seeks to show that two things that we take to be
necessarily separate (like, for example, the subject and the other) are in fact always
already intertwined (the other is “in” me, to use the phrase of A Taste for the Secret).45
This preaccomplished intertwining repeats the “originary dialectic” that sought to make
fact and essence, the empirical and the transcendental, “inseparable and dialectically of a
piece” (PG, 159).
The language of intertwining or contamination can suggest that, rather than being
originary, the intertwining is of two pre-existing and originally separate things, and that
the contamination is therefore a negative situation that longs nostalgically for an earlier
situation of purity. In suggesting that contamination is but a temporary and secondary
problem to be overcome, such thinking does not give enough weight to the fundamental

necessity of the “contamination,” to its productive aspect.
In this regard, the language of economy, which comes to emerge in “Violence and
Metaphysics” proves useful. In an economy, there is a reduction to a symbolic valuation
(for example currency) that opens the door to Baudrillardian hyperrealism,46 but also,
and more importantly for Derrida, to the possibility of exchange, “commerce,” or
“discourse” between the interested parties. Such symbolic valuation and exchange
enables, not just the passing on of information, but also the passing on of tradition (and
hence the progress of science, including philosophy),47 and even, as Derrida is at pains
to show, the very possibility of discourse with the Other that characterizes Levinas’
ethics,48 which themselves both presuppose and are presupposed by phenomenology.49
Economy, then, refers to both the (productive) exchange between the two intercontaminated poles and the (ontological? transcendental?) condition that necessitates and
makes possible that exchange. But these two meanings are always interwoven, always
“dialectically” intertwined. In his discussion of Levinas, for example, Derrida will show
that Levinas fails to capture the radicality of phenomenology (both his own and
Husserl’s) because he, too, like Husserl, fails to adequately account for the
interconnection of both sides of economic debate. Derrida speaks of the “transcendental
origin” that ties together the alterity characteristic of Levinasian ethics and the subjective
constitution of Husserlian phenomenology as an economy which “will permit access to
the other to be determined, in ethical freedom, as moral violence or nonviolence,”50 only
because it is both a pre-condition and the product of such an economic exchange: the
economic “inter-contamination” is itself the product of such an economy, an originary
economy that enables the Greek and the Jew to have productive exchange.51 The
distinction between the two senses of economy, then, must be kept firm (for the sake of
philosophical rigor), even as what it distinguishes can have no real difference. It is, like
the distinction between the “parallels” of the transcendental and the empirical in Husserl,
an irreal distinction which separates (via) nothing.
In Husserl, these strange distinctions can be held together only by the invocation
of “life”52 as the basis of the lived experiences that make up the subject matter of
phenomenology. This life is nothing other than a self-relationship that “is its own division
and its own opposition to its other.”53 Life here does not refer to “day to day life or
biological science,” but to an “ultratranscendental concept of life” which “requires
another name.”54 This idea of that which “produces sameness as self-relation within
self-difference,” which “produces sameness as the nonidentical,” and for which, in order
to understand, “it was necessary to pass through the transcendental reduction” will come
to take the name difference.55
Differance first emerges in Derrida’s work as his name for that movement which
comes closest to describing the paradoxical genesis or economy at the heart of
subjectivity. In the sentence immediately following its introduction as a term in Speech
and Phenomena, Derrida states that the “movement of differance is not something that
happens to a transcendental subject; it produces a subject,”56 and does so via a “pure
difference” that produces “sameness as the nonidentical,”57 thereby constituting the
living present, in its self-presence, as a trace (SP, 85). Since the trace is the relation of the
living present with its ‘outside,’ the trace is always an “openness upon exteriority in
general, upon the sphere of what is not ‘one’s own’” (SP, 86), and as such is not only

temporal but is “from the outset, a ‘spacing’ …space is ‘in’ time; it is time’s pure leavingitself.”58
Differance, then, stands in as the namesake of an originary supplementation,59
necessitated by the nonidentity of the subject’s self-relationship, “which at one and the
same time both fissures and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial
division and delay.”60 Such a fissured and retarded presence cannot be thought on the
basis of consciousness (which is always consciousness as presence, as the living present)
or non-consciousness. It must, rather, be described on the basis of a pre-subjective (but
subject-constituting) “time” and “place,” an ultra-transcendental genetic movement that
always holds in relation “an inside and an outside in general, an existent and a
nonexistent in general, a constituting and a constituted in general.”61 Differance, in
other words, is the very “originary dialectic” described in The Problem of Genesis, an
(ultra-) transcendental counterpart of the notion of economy in “Violence and
Metaphysics.”
ii. Hauntology and the Tension of difference
Like the notion of genesis itself, differance is essentially futural. The concept of
primordial supplementation that is differance implies the non-plenitude of presence that
Derrida calls, “in Husserl’s language, the nonfulfillment of intuition.”62 We recall that it
is futurity that, for Husserl, is in its essence nonfulfilled intuition (even as it makes
fulfillment possible). The temporal non-plenitude of presence is, in phenomenology, a
futural temporality: it is deferral, a deferral which breaks up the very idea of the living
present itself. It is the living present itself which, in genetic phenomenology, is deferred,
and is so “ad infinitum.”63
This deferral of the present by way of a futural temporality contains within itself
an apparent duality that must be understood as the product of an originary economy. In
Specters of Marx, Derrida seeks to make sense of the notion of ‘life’ that is at the centre
of phenomenology, and which was a starting point for his analysis of differance. For
Derrida, life is always lived “in the upkeep, the conversation, the companionship” of
ghosts, which is to say, within a “politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations”
that is characteristic of our finite existence,64 because what affects the subject “is always
a revenant,” which is to say that it “begins by coming back,”65 and therefore
phenomenology can be understood as hauntology, the “logic of haunting.”66
Derrida invokes the notion of ghosts and haunting here for two opposed but
intertwined reasons, reasons that result from the unique temporality of genesis, which
“harbors within itself … eschatology and teleology themselves.”67 These two positions
characterize an originary economy or dialectic at the heart of the temporality of genesis.
In one sense, then, phenomenology as hauntology supports the Husserlian
position of constitution within horizons: the future is nothing more than the outgrowth of
the past, and hence everything futural is, in essence, nothing more than a repetition of the
past, “the past as absolute future,”68 where “what seems to be out front, the future,
comes back in advance: from the past, from the back.”69
But Derrida is at pains to show another form of temporality as well,70 one that
does not unite past and future together in the present (the past-present and the future-

present), but rather one in which “time is out of joint.”71 In invoking “ghosts” as his
trope of inheritance, Derrida is intending to call forth the personal element of inheritance,
which makes inheritance a matter of justice, of responsibility.72 This seat of justice is
located “within that which disjoins the living present,” that is, within the “noncontemporaneity with itself of the living present.”73 This marks a shift in emphasis from
Derrida’s earlier discussions of the non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present:
in differance as discussed above, for example, that which divides the present from itself is
a what (differance; also, khora, supplement, originary dialectic, etc.), whereas now this
division is a who.74 This turn to the “who” opens up the question of responsibility for
Derrida, a responsibility that is also and always a response-ability, the ability to respond
to the Other who has already called to us.75 As response to the other, the question
becomes that of arrival, and, as such, a question of the future, of “the regard to what will
come in the future-to-come [l’à-venir].”76 In the subtle change from l’avenir [future] to
l’à-venir [future-to-come], Derrida highlights the infinitive form of the future,77 but also
its personal element of address to [à] another.78 By opening up this infinitive and
intersubjective element, Derrida reconceives of futural temporality itself along more
Levinasian lines: “Turned toward the future, going toward it, it also comes from it, it
proceeds from [provient de] the future.”79 In this, Derrida has made explicit the doublenecessity, the originary dialectic, of differance: first, the future as absolute past, as
growing out of the past: teleology; second, the future as relation to the address of the
other, as coming from the future: eschatology.80
iii. The Messianic
These two senses of the future are captured most succinctly in Derrida’s notion of
the messianic, which is distinguished into two moments: messianicity81 and messianism.
Via the general notion of the messianic, Derrida seeks to hold these two accounts together
in tension, without resolving either into the other.82 It is Derrida’s express intention, in
making this distinction, to distinguish a “structure of experience” from “a religion,”83 in
a way similar, I will argue, to the way in which economy refers to both a transcendental
condition of being “dialectically of a piece,” as well as the productive exchange between
those dialectical poles in historical and empirical conditions. In the messianic, the
structure of experience is deemed messianicity, and it accords with the eschatological
notion of futurity discussed above, while messianism is meant to refer to what is
produced in particular historical and empirical conditions via the transcendental
condition,84 and refers to the teleological account discussed above.
The beginnings of this can be seen in the “predicates” that Derrida ascribes to
messianicity: “annunciation of an unpredictable future, relation to the other, affirmation,
promise, revolution, justice.”85 These predicates are fleshed out in Specters of Marx in
passages such as the following:
Ascesis strips the messianic hope [i.e., messianicity] of all biblical forms, and
even all determinable figures of the wait or expectation; it thus denudes itself in
view of responding to that which must be absolute hospitality, the ‘yes’ to the
arrivant(e), the ‘come’ to the future that cannot be anticipated . . . Open, waiting
for the event as justice, this hospitality is absolute only if its [sic] keeps watch
over its own universality.86

Fortuitously, the quotation begins with a word that harkens back to the phenomenological
heritage that Derrida has inherited, and which “haunts” his exploration of the
messianic.87 This ascesis is the rigorous self-discipline of the phenomenologist
employing the reduction.88 The lack of content in messianicity, then, is not, contrary to
some commentators,89 the result of a Kantian quest for formal universality,90 but is the
result of the epokhē which Derrida holds to be “essential” to messianicity and to “the
messianic in general, as thinking of the other and of the event to come.”91 If
messianicity is, then, to a certain extent structural or formal,92 this is only as it relates to
a futurity (event to come) that is intersubjective (thinking of the other), that is, a futurity
that puts it in relation with the other who calls me. This is what makes messianicity
responsible/ response-able (“it thus denudes itself in view of responding”; emphasis
added) to the Other who must come, who will come, and who must be treated with
hospitality.93 But this Other, of course, must come as an “event,” and not as the
outgrowth of the past into a future (present). This aspect of messianicity is marked by the
term “waiting” above. A non-teleological futurity that waits, open, for the arrival of the
Other: what is this but eschatology?94
But this, of course, is only one side of the messianic. On the other side, we have
the concrete histories of the determinate messianisms. While Derrida says that one may
see messianicity as “the condition of the religions of the Book,” one may also, and
equally, consider the Abrahamic messianisms as “the only events on the basis of which
we approach and first of all name the messianic in general.”95 Messianisms, then, are
the “other ghost which we cannot and ought not do without” (Ibid.). They would seem to
be the historical “material” of our horizons, the very horizonality that makes experience
possible. As such, they operate within the teleological conception of futurity, that
conception which makes the past into an “absolute future.”
Messianisms, then, provide concretion,96 and a certain urgency, to the open
waiting of messianicity. While messianicity awaits the future to-come, messianisms keep
us connected with the past (present), and hence give weight to the future (as future
present): what comes in the future is urgently important, because, soon, imminently in
fact, the future will be the present, that is, will be my living present, our experience. But,
as the living present, it is always already interrupted by the very temporality of that living
present itself, the differance-ial temporality of phenomenological genesis that Derrida has
elsewhere shown to be characteristic of “life” in its phenomenological sense. This
temporality interrupts the living present even as it establishes the living present as both
“life” and the “present.” In trying to tie both of these movements (the transcendental and
the empirical) together, the messianic in general is characterized as “urgency, imminence
but, irreducible paradox, a waiting without horizon of expectation,”97 which is to say that
it is an “historical opening to the future.”98 As historical (messianism), the messianic
must be, not only rooted in the past, but also essentially empirical; but as opening to the
future (messianicity), the messianic must be transcendental, essential, ideal, that is,
philosophical. It is the task of the messianic (in general) to hold together these two poles,
without collapsing either into the other. This is the paradoxical condition of the
messianic. It is also the doubly-necessary condition of differance, and the originarily
dialectical character of phenomenological temporality.
III. A Genuinely Phenomenological Intentionality

Earlier, we noted the essential connection between a theory of time as futural and
an account of intentionality. In this regard, the two distinct accounts of futurity at work in
phenomenology (teleological and eschatological) accord with two distinct accounts of
intentionality at work in phenomenology (idealist and naïve realist, or transcendental and
empirical).99 Derrida’s conception of a futurity of double-necessity would suggest, then,
that intentionality must maintain both the subjective constitution of the world and the
ontological constitution of the subject by the world. As Derrida put it in The Problem of
Genesis, it is a matter of realizing that our “primitive existence” in the world cannot be
radically distinguished from the genesis of “originary sense,”100 because of the collusion
of constituted and constituting within the very life of the phenomenological subject.101
In this, Derrida’s account of phenomenological intentionality echoes that of Fink,
that great disciple of Husserl, who was compelled to write “The Phenomenological
Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism” because too many
philosophers in his day were conflating phenomenology with neo-Kantianism (that is
with the ‘idealism’ described above). For Fink, the key problem of phenomenology is the
“question concerning the origin of the world.”102 By investigating the “origin of the
world,” phenomenology is able to get beneath “dogmatic metaphyics” and its ontological
and “naïve” conception of the world, and critical (neo-Kantian) philosophy’s concern
with “the meaning of beings.”103 Phenomenology, in its essence, seeks to unite elements
of both critical philosophy (that is its transcendental character) and metaphysics (that is
its concern for the origin of the world), without falling into the sharp divorce between the
world and the non-world, or between this world and another world, that is the downfall of
both.
For Fink, the reduction constitutes a “movement” of knowledge that enables both
the transcending and the retention of the world within the absolute of transcendental
subjectivity.104 By this movement, phenomenology seeks to show that the world is not
“founded” on a distinct “foundational” sphere (for example the God or Being of
speculative metaphysics), but rather that there is a necessary correlation between founded
and foundational, between constituted and constituting. In phenomenological
intentionality, the world is both transcended and yet still present; that is, the world is
simultaneously constituted and constituting, by reference to its inclusion in the absolute
that constitutes it, an inclusion that is pre-phenomenological, that is, before the
reduction.105
The reduction, therefore, reveals the proper theme of phenomenological
philosophy: the transcendental constitution of the origin of the world within transcendent
life.106 Via the “habitualities and potentialities of transcendental life,” we see that
transcendental life is “communalized in the process of constitution,” and therefore that
transcendental subjectivity is essentially intersubjective.107
In its essence, therefore, phenomenology seeks to challenge the sharp divide
between the world and the non-world, in part by showing that the world is both
transcendental and immanent to the absolute that constitutes it, and therefore that the
world is both constituted and constituting. This is the central meaning of intentionality,
itself the great breakthrough of Husserlian phenomenology. By way of the reduction,
which is the method and way of knowing that is “the most essential feature of
phenomenology’s unique character,”108 phenomenology exposes itself as a movement

that both transcends the world and simultaneously acknowledges the givenness of the
world, and hence waits for the sensuousness of that givenness. By so doing, the reduction
reveals a transcendental subjectivity that is simultaneously monadic and intersubjective
or communal. And all of these apparent contradictions take place within the sphere of
“life.”
But “life,” in its phenomenological sense as a “strange unity” of “two parallels”
that are simultaneously different but yet united, and which is, therefore, united while
being “its own division and its own opposition to its other,”109 is nothing but another
name for differance.110 In other words, the very double-necessities that characterized
Derrida’s understanding of phenomenological temporality—the simultaneous necessity of
immanence to experience and transcendence of experience, of striving forward in activity
while also awaiting in passivity, the necessary intersubjectivity of the subject—also
characterize phenomenology itself in its most basic methodologies: intentionality and the
reduction. Derrida’s account of differance and the messianic, then, provide not only an
account of phenomenological temporality, but of phenomenological intentionality,
indeed, of phenomenology itself.
IV. The Future of Phenomenology
But, in providing an account of phenomenology, Derrida does much more than
merely critique Husserl’s understanding of his own project. In bringing to the fore the
double-movement (or double-necessity) of phenomenological genesis and its centrality to
phenomenology, Derrida not only elucidates the phenomenological project more clearly,
but he also poses some problems that must be answered before phenomenology can move
forward on solid ground. In this last section, I will try to elucidate some of these
problems, not in the hope of solving them (a task that is far too vast for a paper of this
type), but so as to try to clearly lay out the questions that future research in
phenomenology must answer.
To begin with, by showing that the temporality of the living present of the
phenomenological subject entails that the subject’s self-relationship is not that of pure
identity but is rather an identity-in-difference, Derrida brings to the fore the question of
mediation and its centrality to the heart of the phenomenological method itself. For
anything to appear to this subject, then, it must find a way of present-ing itself in spite of,
and by way of, the unique temporality of genesis that both makes possible and interrupts
the living present. The temporality characteristic of phenomenology’s futural orientation
is able to function only by way of an originary supplementation, differance, which is “the
‘in the place of’ (für etwas) structure which belongs to every sign in general.”111 At the
root of the absolute consciousness of the phenomenological subject is the necessity of the
structure of the sign, that is, of mediation, and therefore every appearing-to-the-subject,
every “phenomenon supposes originary contamination by the sign.”112 But the sign
only works within an arbitrary system of value and originary supplementation,113 in
which signs are infinitely repeatable (or iterable, in Derrida’s terminology).114
This explanation of the deferral of the living present “ad infinitum”115 echoes the
formal infinity of Husserl’s account of ideality as omnitemporality,116 and so raises the
question of the epistemology that underlies phenomenology. If the genetic temporality at
the heart of phenomenology delays presence ad infinitum, and so necessitates the

structure of supplementation, the sign, and mediation more generally, then how can
phenomenology continue to take as its core epistemological principle the “principle of
principles”: that “every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of
cognition, that everything originarily (so to speak, in its ‘personal’ authority) offered to us
in ‘intuition’ is to be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within
the limits in which it is presented there?”117 The necessity of supplementation at the
heart of lived experience problematizes the notion of intuition,118 and the relatively
simplistic association it seems to make between intuition and self-givenness. If our
intuition is structured by the “in-the-place-of” structure of supplementation, then must not
semiotics (or language, broadly construed) play an essential role in phenomenological
epistemologies, and even, perhaps, in the notion of givenness itself?119 Is a
phenomenological epistemology not then forced to make sense of the importance given to
the sign, not just by Derrida, but also by Husserl (for example in “Origin of Geometry”),
and of the deferral of ideality, not just via the sign, but also via the invocation of the Idea
in the Kantian sense (that is in the Vienna lecture and the Crisis)?120
But there is a second notion of infinity also at work in the ‘infinite’ deferral of
phenonemenological temporality highlighted by Derrida. The formal infinity discussed
above bears a certain relationship to death (as opposed to the “life” of the living present,
the life that is another name for differance)121 in that ideal objects must be able to
function in the absence of the ego thinking those objects, of any ego thinking those
objects. It is surviving the death of the subject that language makes possible, and hence
opens the possibility of ideality.122 But given this possibility, sense—which cannot be
separated from ideality—must also bear some relation to the death of the subject; any
sense bestowed on the world must function apart from the ego that so bestows that sense.
It must function, at least in part, ideally. As such, sense goes beyond merely the
relationship between the ego and the object—it goes also, simultaneously, to the other
(person), the other “absolute origin and zero point of the world,”123 the other who shares
in the project of transcendental constitution by sharing in ideality.
This second sense of infinity, then, highlights the differential aspect of differance:
differance opens the distance between self and Other. But differance also, via language
(and the formal infinity), entails the possibility of crossing that distance. And the relation
to the Other is not only a differentiating relationship, it is also a deferring relationship:
the relationship to the Other is, for Levinas, the relationship to the future (the
impossibility of fulfillment, the ceaseless striving, etc.). Differance, therefore, not only
opens the double-necessity that the Other must appear in intuitive presence while
simultaneously exceeding that intuitive presence, but it also entails the necessarily
intersubjective, and hence historical and political, influences on the formation of sense.
That is, if the genetic temporality at the heart of phenomenology has a necessarily
intersubjective component, then searching for the genesis of sense only within the subject
itself will necessarily prove inadequate. There are essential intersubjective—and
therefore ethical and political—concerns that shape the very constitution of sense itself,
and phenomenology cannot therefore so easily “bracket” these seemingly “empirical” or
historical concerns as matters of the natural attitude that must be reduced in order to yield
truly transcendental insights. Rather, as both Derrida and the later Husserl have shown,
the truly transcendental insights must be only quasi-transcendental, maintaining within
themselves complex economic relationships to empirical concerns.124 But how can one
take such concerns seriously and still employ the phenomenological reduction? If

completing the reduction is indeed impossible,125 how can we conceive of even a partial
reduction that will help us yield truly (quasi-) transcendental insights? If political and
historical factors must remain within the scope of phenomenological investigation, what
must properly be bracketed out from those investigations? How, exactly, is
phenomenology to deal with historical and political concerns? And is there some room
for hermeneutics and presuppositions within transcendental phenomenology?
Conclusion
Derrida seems to suggest that phenomenology can be truly transcendental only by
refusing to cease being empirical.126 While this seems to accord with a genuinely
Husserlian understanding of intentionality (such as that put forward by Fink), it
nevertheless raises several problems that must be explored before phenomenology can be
considered to be on a firm foundation: first, a genuinely phenomenological understanding
of language must be developed that takes account of the temporality of genesis that
establishes the living present, but only at the expense of placing supplementation at the
heart of the subject; secondly, the “principle of principles” can remain the foundation of a
phenomenological epistemology only if the issue of givenness is revisited in light of the
necessity of supplementation in subjective intuition; third, given that the living present is
not only deferred temporally but is differed intersubjectively, phenomenology must be
able to understand political and ethical concerns as central to any understanding of the
self-givenness and self-constitution of the subject; and fourth, while the reduction
remains essential for a transcendental understanding of phenomenology, it must be
reconceived so as to take adequate account of the fact that empirical concerns are central
to the subject. Understanding Derrida’s work from within a phenomenological framework
provides (at least) these four broad problematics as future phenomenological concerns, if
phenomenology hopes to have a future as a serious philosophical discipline.
It may be objected, of course, that one need not employ Derrida to get such a
critique. Surely ‘existential’ phenomenology makes a similar critique of Husserl:
Merleau-Ponty, for example, clearly critiques Husserl’s account of the reduction (our 4th
point, above), and Heidegger seems to make political and ethical concerns central to any
understanding of the self-givenness and self-constitution of the subject (as recommended
by our 3rd point above). Therefore, the critique we are applying to Derrida seems to apply,
not to the future of phenomenological research, but rather to its past.
However, there remains a distinct difference between what Derrida’s work
suggests is necessary if phenomenology is to continue, and what is offered by Heidegger
and Merleau-Ponty.127 This difference is encapsulated by the necessity of placing
supplementation at the heart of the phenomenological subject:128 that is, it is not clear
that Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty sufficiently challenge the self-presence of the
phenomenological subject from an epistemological perspective. While both seem to
challenge the ontological status of the subject,129 and move phenomenology in new
directions on that ground, neither, it seems to Derrida, use this breakthrough to challenge
the epistemological foundations of the phenomenological method.130 The question that
remains to be answered is whether “existential” phenomenology—as practiced variously
by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and others—has done enough in its “ontological” critique
to accommodate such an epistemological move (suggesting that they were unaware of the
far-reaching nature of their own critique) or whether their “ontological” critique was

insufficiently critical, and hence could not lead to the epistemological critique that
Derrida deems necessary (suggesting, perhaps, that their critique of Husserl was not as
radical as they may have hoped).131
Derrida’s work suggests, then, that not only must phenomenology deal with the
four broad problematics outlined above, but it must deal with all of them in an
interconnected manner. This is to say that future phenomenological research must begin
by accounting for the necessary supplementation at the heart of the phenomenological
subject before it can advance a sufficiently phenomenological account of givenness,
transcendence, or the reduction. While such a project seems possible—is at least
plausible—to what extent it will still be recognized as phenomenology remains an open
question. The work of Jean-Luc Marion, for example, seems to be such an attempt to
account for that necessary supplementation (via the notion of the “interlocuted subject”)
in a way that also grounds a new account of givenness, transcendence and the reduction.
However, his work is criticized by Janicaud as emblematic of a “swerve” away from
phenomenology toward something else (in Janicaud’s estimation, theology).132 If what I
am arguing for in this paper is true and Janicaud is also correct, it seems that
phenomenology is a self-defeating enterprise: the rigorous pursuit of its goals according
to its own methods would lead to a move away from those very goals and methods
toward some other discipline. To re-phrase the problem in more standard Derridean
language: the end of phenomenology would be phenomenology’s end.133 In order to
avoid this problem, future phenomenological research must refine its self-understanding
so as to prove either Derrida or Janicaud wrong. If it cannot do so, the future of
phenomenology may prove to be shorter than it had imagined.
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